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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONGRESS' GREEN MONSTER: COPYRIGHT
EXTENSION AND THE CONCERN FOR CASH
OVER THE PROPAGATION OF ART

"A dwarf standing on the shoulder of a giant can see farther than
the giant himself."'
I. INTRODUCTION

It is a truism that nothing is original, rather every new work is
based on an old one.2 Creation occurs not by creating something
from absolutely nothing, but by using predecessors' stories,
themes, sounds, and art as building blocks and transforming them
into new works by adding the new creator's own unique spin,
perspective, or style.3 Evidently, the drafters of the Constitution
recognized the mechanisms of creation and devised a way to
ensure the advancement of the arts - by providing Congress the
power to grant copyright protection to these creators for a limited
time. 4 Hence, the Copyright Clause was conceived. As a result,
the limited economic benefit it granted provided authors an
incentive to invest their time and energy in producing works, while
allowing other creators to build off existing works once copyright
protection expired. However, Congress took its power too far and
through its repeated copyright extensions, essentially negated the
purpose of copyright law and the carefully crafted Copyright
Clause. These extensions have whittled away a vibrant public
domain and slowly strangled creativity. Congress' most recent

1Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: ,45 COLUM. L.
REv.503, 511 (1945).
2 Jessica Litnan, The PublicDomain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 966 (1990).
3
Id.at 966-67.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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extension, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 5 which
grants an individual author copyright protection for her life plus 70
years, further strains creativity. In effect, it grants copyright
owners excessive protection and economic benefit - contrary to the
Copyright Clause's aims. Consequently, Congress' actions erode
away the artistic wealth of the public domain and empower
copyright owners to dictate creation, while allowing the public to
see only as far as the giant himself can see.
This article examines the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in the case Eldred v. Reno,6 where the
court held that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(hereinafter, the "CTEA") was constitutional. 7 Part I outlines the
basic principles of copyright law and Congress' historical exercise
of its copyright power. Part II of the article describes the issues
implicated by Eldred v. Reno and the majority's and dissent's
analysis. Part III criticizes the court's decision and explains how
Congress surpassed its copyright power by enacting the CTEA. It
explains that the preamble of the Copyright Clause limits
Congress' power to grant copyright protection. However, the
extension fails to meet this Constitutional mandate by failing to
promote progress, but rather inhibiting it. It also explains that
economic interests were Congress' primary motivation in passing
the legislation. Moreover, Part III analyzes several suggested
solutions for determining when Congress violates the Copyright
Clause and proposes an analysis courts should use to determine an
extension's constitutionality. Finally, Part IV delves into the
CTEA's impact on the progress of the creative arts.
II. BACKGROUND

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants Congress
the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
' Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
301-304 (1998)).
6 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
7
1d. at 380.
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Right to their respective rights and discoveries." 8 This clause,
commonly known as the Copyright Clause, gives creators a
monopoly over their creative works for a fixed time, and is
primarily concerned with the promulgation of artistic creation for
the benefit of the public. 9 The primary goal achieved by copyright
law is to secure "the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors."' 0 As expressed in Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, Inc.," copyright "is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their2
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired."'
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the clause
compensates authors for their creative efforts and labor, it has
stated that copyright law's "ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.",13 The
philosophy behind allowing Congress to grant a limited monopoly
to authors and inventors is that the public will benefit from the
benefits encourage
talents of authors and inventors if monetary
14
them to invest in their creative efforts.
The congressional copyright power is further clarified by also
referring to Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution.
This clause provides Congress with the power "To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
In
Constitution in the Government of the United States.'
16
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recognized that
"Congress is not empowered by [the Constitution] to make all
laws.. .but such only as may be 'necessary and proper' for carrying
8U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, C1. 8.

9Nimmer on Copyright §1.03 [A] (2001).
10United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
" 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
12Id. at 429.
13Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
14Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)(citing Washingtonian Pub Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
" U.S.CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18. (emphasis added).
16 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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them into execution."' 7 The Court further construed this to mean
that the end must be legitimate, within the scope of the
Constitution and that "all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
[consistent] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are
constitutional."' 8
In 1790, the First Congress exercised this enumerated power and
created copyright protection for works already in print, as well as
future works, for an initial term of fourteen years, and a fourteenyear renewal term. 19 Effectively, the original copyright clause
granted a combined twenty-eight year protection period.20 Fortyone years later, in 1831, Congress utilized its power once again
and extended the initial copyright term to twenty-eight years,
resulting in a total protection period of forty-two years. 21 Nearly a
century later, Congress extended the renewal term to twenty-eight
years, thereby creating a fifty-six-year period of protection.22
Beginning in 1962, Congress frequently extended protection for
23
subsisting copyrights by incrementally increasing their duration.
In 1962, copyrights subsisting in any work, on the effective date of
the amendment, were extended to December 31, 1965, thereby
granting a maximum copyright term of fifty-nine years. 24 In 1965,
Congress extended this duration, again, to December
31, 1967,
25
with a maximum copyright term of sixty-one years.
Two years later, in 1967, the subsisting copyright was extended
for another year to December 31, 1968. 26 From 1968 to 1971,
Congress annually extended subsisting copyrights' protection to
the following year, or in the case of 1972, for the following two

'7 Id. at 413.

I1d. at 421.
of May 31, 1790 §1, 1 Stat. 124.

19 Act
20
2

id.

' Act of Feb. 3, 1831 §1,4 Stat. 436.
2 Act of March 4, 1909 §23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
2
24 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
H.RJ. Res. 627, 87th Cong., 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
2
5 H.R.J. Res. 431, 89th Cong., 79 Stat. 581 (1965).
26 S.J. Res. 114, 90th Cong., 81 Stat. 464 (1967).
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years. 27 Then, once more, Congress extended subsisting
copyrights, set to expire in 1974, to December 31, 1976.28
In the final version of the Copyright Act, adopted in 1976,
29
Congress altered the way it calculated copyright duration.
Instead of defining the initial term of a copyright by a set number
of years, the Copyright Act of 1976 provided a basic term of
copyright protection for the life of the author, plus an additional
fifty years.30 Works created prior to the effective date of the Act,
January 1, 1978, were given protection for a maximum of seventyfive years from the date 31
of publication or 100 years from creation,
less.
was
one
whichever
Finallyi, in 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998.32 The CTEA provided that a work
created on or after January 1, 1978, enjoys copyright protection for
a term of the life of the author, plus seventy years after her death an additional twenty years. 33 For anonymous works,
pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the Act extended
the term from seventy-five years to ninety-five years from the year
of its first publication, or from 100 years to 120 years from the
year of its creation. 34 Finally, for a work created before 1978, for
which its initial term was twenty-eight years, the CTEA extended
its renewal term from forty-seven years to sixty-seven years,
35
creating a maximum copyright term of ninety-five years.
Effectively, the Act added twenty years to the life of all copyright
terms, for both subsisting and prospective copyrights.
27 See S.J. Res. 172, 90th Cong., 82 Stat. 397 (1968); S.J. Res. 143, 91st Cong.,

83 Stat. 360 (1969); S.J. Res. 230, 91st Cong., 84 Stat. 1441 (1970); S.J. Res.
132, 92nd Cong., 85 Stat. 490 (1971); SJ. Res. 247, 92nd Cong., 86 Stat. 1181
(1972).
28 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573 § 104, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
29 S. REP. No. 104-315, at 6 (1996).
30 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 §§ 302-05, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573-76
(1976).
31
id.
32
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (1998)).
3 See id. § 302(a).
34
See id. § 302(c).
35
See id. § 304(a).
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36
III. ELDRED V. RENO

A.

Facts

After the CTEA's passage, the plaintiffs, filed suit in the District
Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality
of the CTEA.37 More specifically, they alleged that, but for the
CTEA, they would have legally been allowed to copy, distribute,
or perform works freely that now would not enter the public
domain for a period of twenty more years. 38 Among the plaintiffs
were Eric Eldred, Eldritch Press, Higginson Book Company, Jill
A. Crandall, Tri-Horn International, Luck's Music Library, Inc.,
Edwin F. Kalmus Co., American Film Heritage Association,
Moviecraft, Inc., Dover Publications, Inc., and Copyright's
Commons (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"). 39
The plaintiffs utilized
works in the public domain in their occupations and businesses.4 °
For example, Plaintiff Eric Eldred, Director of Plaintiff Eldritch
Press, a non-profit unincorporated association,4 1 launched an
electronic library of public domain works on the Internet at
<http://eldred.ne.mediaone.net> 4. 2 This library made rare and outof-print books that were difficult to locate in libraries or
bookstores, available to the public. 43 In addition, this website
enabled the blind to access these works through text-to-speech
converters. 44
36 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
37
1d. at 374.
38

Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C.

Cir.
2001).
39 Id.
40 Eldred, 239

F.3d at 374.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 2, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/complaintamd2.html (last visited Oct.
26,
42 2001).
Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader,THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, August
29, 1999, availableat www.boston.com/globe/magazine/829/featurestoryl.shtm3l (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
41

43id.

441id.
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Also among the plaintiffs were a book company that reprinted
rare books, 45 companies that published and sold public domain
sheet music to orchestras, 46 a church choir director,47 a non-profit
film preservation group, 48 a film archive, 49 and a non-profit
coalition, which promoted a rich public domain.50
B. ProceduralHistory
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment against the Attorney
General Janet Reno, in her official capacity, that the CTEA was
unconstitutional.5 1 More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
CTEA violated the First Amendment and that its retrospective
application was beyond Congress' power under the Copyright
Clause. 52 Plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief against the criminal enforcement of §2(b) of the
No Electronic Theft Act of 1997. 53 The District Court granted the
the
Defendant's motion for Judgment on the pleadings, dismissing
54
plaintiff s case, and holding the CTEA is constitutional.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action.
With Judge Ginsburg writing the majority opinion, the court held
that the CTEA was constitutional, that the plaintiff-appellants did
not have a First Amendment right in the copyrighted work of
45 Eldredv. Reno Plaintiffs,at

http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/plaintiffs.html (last visited Oct. 22,

2001).
46 id.

47 Plaintiffs'

Second Amended Complaint 4, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/complaint-amd2.html (last visited Oct.
26,
48 2001).
Id. at 8.
49
Id. at 9.
5od. at 11.
5' Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999), affid, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C.

cir. 2001).

52

53

id.

Id. at2, n. 2.

54 Id. at

2.
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others, and that the Copyright Clause did not restrain Congress'
power to extend copyright durations. Judge Sentelle dissented in
part, arguing that the Copyright Clause limited Congress' power to
extend the copyright term. The plaintiff-appellants petitioned for a
rehearing en banc, but was denied on July 13, 2001.55 As a result,
plaintiffs have petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari,
which has been granted.56
C. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the
CTEA on three basis: First, that the CTEA violated the First
Amendment; second, that already existing works fail to meet the
originality requirement of the Copyright Clause, and, therefore, the
CTEA could not extend further copyright protection to those
preexisting works; and, third, that the CTEA violated the
Copyright Clause's "limited Times" requirement.57 Writing for
the majority, Judge Ginsburg addressed each of these issues in
turn.
1. FirstAmendment
Judge Ginsburg first considered the appellants' standing to
challenge the CTEA with respect to subsisting copyrighted
works. 58 By the nature of the appellants' occupations and
59
businesses, appellants benefit from public domain works.
Because they would have been able to utilize the additional works
about to enter the public domain, but for the CTEA's enactment,
the court found that they had an injury in fact, traceable to the
CTEA. 60 Therefore, the appellants had standing to pursue their
5 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (2001).
56

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub. nom. Eldred

v.
Ashcroft, 2002 WL 232898 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002)(No. 01-618).
57
Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374.
58
Id. at 375.
59 Id.

60 id.
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First Amendment claim.6 In addition, the majority concluded that
the appellants had standing to challenge the CTEA with respect to
prospective works, because the appellants still would not benefit
from works not in the public domain.62
After establishing the appellants' standing, the court questioned
whether the appellants possessed a First Amendment interest in
copyrighted works. 63 Answering in the negative, the court noted
that they did not have a First Amendment right to commercially
use the copyrighted works of others.64 Relying on the
idea/expression dichotomy, the majority explained that copyright
law allowed free communication of facts and ideas, but extended
protection only to authors' expression. 65 Building on this notion,
the court argued that because only expression is copyrightable in
the first place, the CTEA would only extend copyright duration to
expression and not to facts. 66 Therefore, the court found there was
no First Amendment concern because ideas are ineligible for
copyright protection in the first place. 67
2. OriginalityRequirement
The D.C. Circuit rejected the appellants' contention that the
CTEA violated the originality requirement of the Copyright Clause
68
because it extended the duration of already copyrighted works.
Appellants argued that because the work already existed, it failed
to exhibit the requisite originality. 69 The court rejected the
appellants' arguments because the work exhibited the necessary
originality to obtain copyright protection in the first place, thus it
was not necessary to demonstrate further originality for the
611id.
62

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
6SId. at 375.
6 id.
6
1Id. at 376.
6 Id.
67
Eldred,239 F.3d at 376.
61 Id. at 377..
69
Id. at 376.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII: 109

copyright to continue. 70 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
Congress would not provide for copyright renewal if copyrighted
works had to demonstrate further originality. 71 The court criticized
appellants' failure to present any authority - neither case nor
commentary - that distinguished the originality requirement for
the initial grant of copyright from the extension of that already
existing copyright.72 The appellants attempted to analogize patent
and trademark law to the copyright controversy. 73 They
maintained, under Graham v. John Deer Co., 7 4 Congress could not
75
issue patents that removed knowledge from the public domain.
Moreover, the appellants contended that, in the Trade-Mark
Cases,76 the Court said that because trademarks involved
something already in existence, it did not fall under the Copyright
Clause.
While the D.C. Circuit agreed that these cases are
consistent with the notion that works already in the public domain
lack originality, the court emphasized that that was not the
question it must answer.78 Instead, the court found it necessary
only to address whether Congress can create legislation allowing a
copyright to persist beyond its renewal term. The court declined to
address whether a work is copyrightable, because the works
79
subject to the discussion are in fact already copyrightable.
Consequently, the court rejected the appellants' originality
challenged to the CTEA.8 °

70
71

72
73

1d. at 377.
id.

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 377.
id.

74 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
75
Eldred,239 F.3d at 377.
76 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
77 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 377.
78
79

80

id.
id.

Id.
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3. Limited Times Restriction
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' contention that the
CTEA violated the "limited Times" requirement of the Copyright
Clause. Plaintiffs contended that the introductory language of the
clause, "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,"
restricts the "limited Times" requirement, to a term that achieves
only that purpose. 81 Relying on the D.C. Circuit case, Schnapper
v. Foley,82 the court vehemently rejected this argument. The
Schnapper court held that the preamble of the Copyright Clause
did not limit Congress' power. 83 The court found the appellants'
dual position problematic. The majority criticized the appellants
for arguing the preamble was not a substantive limit on Congress'
power, but at the same time arguing that it limited the duration
more strictly than the text itself provided.84
4. Criticism of the DissentingArguments
After methodically disposing of the appellants' contentions, the
court addressed the dissent's arguments. 85 The majority criticized
Judge Sentelle for adopting a narrow view of Schnapper, as
suggested by an amicus, although neither the appellants nor the
appellee raised the issue on appeal. 86 Nevertheless, the court
entertained the argument.87 Judge Ginsburg reviewed the CTEA
using the analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland.88 The appropriate
question, according to Judge Ginsburg, was whether the CTEA
was a necessary and proper exercise of Congressional power
granted by the Copyright Clause. 89 In other words, the CTEA
81

Id. at 377-78.
82 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
83 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 378.
84id.
s Id.
86

id.

87 id.
88Eldred, 239

F.3d at 378. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)

316,421(1819).
89
Id,
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must be an appropriate means, plainly adapted to the end, which is
the Copyright Clause mandates - to promote the progress of the
creative arts. 90 The court was satisfied with Congress' finding that
the extension of copyright duration would give incentive to
creators to preserve older works. 91 Consequently, the court viewed
the CTEA as an appropriate
means for achieving the end
92
preamble.
the
in
prescribed
The court further attacked the dissent's argument that the
"limited Times" requirement restricted Congress from extending
duration of copyrights, emphasizing that an identifiable term of
years, which the CTEA effectively created, was, in fact, a limit.93
The majority further rejected the dissents' contention that by
allowing Congress to extend copyright duration it could effectively
94
grant a perpetual copyright by passing a series of extensions.
According to Judge Ginsburg, this concern was obviously not
present because the CTEA merely matched United States
copyright duration to that of the European Union. 95 The court
concluded that Congress properly and necessarily used its power to
harmonize U.S. law to the global standard, and not to create a
perpetual copyright.96
The D.C. Circuit disposed of the dissent's argument that
extending a subsisting copyright does not promote the progression
of the creative arts.97 To the contrary, the court perceived the
extension as promoting progress by "[p]reserving access to works
that would otherwise disappear - not enter the public domain but
disappear." 98 The court emphasized that the first congress applied
90

Id.

91 Id. at 379. More specifically, Congress found that the extension would give
copyright owners, of old motion pictures, incentive to restore them. See S. REP.
No. 104-315, at 12 (1996).
92
Eldred,239 F.3d at 379.
93 id.
94 id.

95 Id.
96 id.
97
98

Eldred,239 F.3d at 379.

id.
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the Copyright Act of 1790 to subsisting copyrights. 99 Because the
First Congress was contemporary with the Constitution's
formation, the court deferred to its judgment. 100 Further, the court
reasoned that when "the rights thus established have not been
disputed [for this long], it is almost conclusive."' 0 1 Furthermore,
the court relied on the Supreme Court's acceptance of Congress'
power to extend terms of existing patents. 10 2 According to the
majority, the Court has deferred to Congress' consideration of the
law at the time and changed circumstances regarding patents, and
decided that there are no restraints on Congress' power to modify
the term.' 0 3 The D.C. Circuit pointed out that in copyright law, the
Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment. 10 4 It
recognized that Congress has the duty to balance competing
05
interests and to determine the appropriate 6opyright duration.1
Accordingly, the court deferred to Congress' findings and
that the CTEA was within Congress' Copyright Clause
concluded
10 6
power.
D. The.DissentingOpinion
While concurring with most of the majority's opinion, Judge
Sentelle, writing the dissent, disagreed with the constitutionality of
the copyright extension for existing works. 10 7 As a guide, Judge
Sentelle used United States v. Lopez10 8 and its look into "first
principles" to conduct his analysis and to determine the scope of
Congress' power. 10 9 Under Lopez, the Supreme Court reiterated

99

Id.
Id.

101 Id.
0

2Eldred,239 F.3d

at 380.

103 Id.
1

04 Id.
1osId.

106.1d.
'

07

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380.

U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
'09 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381.
10"514
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the principle that Congress' Commerce Clause power is limited.1 10
Consequently, it would then follow that these limits would also
apply to all of Congress' enumerated powers, not just the
Commerce Clause.11 ' The dissent used the Lopez Court's analysis,
as guidance in determining the limits on Congress' power under
the Copyright Clause.' 12 According to Judge Sentelle, the Lopez
Court acknowledged, "that limitations on the commerce power are
113
inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause."'
Analogizing this analysis to the present case, the dissent argued
that the Copyright Clause gave Congress the power only "to
Promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." 114 This
could only be done by granting an exclusive right to authors for
limited times, according to the "limited Times" clause. 115 The
dissent argued that there was no distinction between granting
copyright owners permanent protection and Congress permanently
having this opportunity to extend copyright protection.11 6 Judge
Sentelle warned that Congress could realize permanent copyright
protection indirectly by continuously extending current copyright
durations.1 17 Therefore, he argued that the Copyright Clause
created a "definable stopping point" that prevents this pitfall of
infinite protection.118 Furthermore, the dissent rejected the
defendant's arguments that the retroactive extensions promoted
progress to the creative arts, but instead, saw that the limits laid
out in the clause's preamble were violated.' 19
In response to the majority's assertion that Schnapper rejected
the notion that the preamble is a limit, the dissent conceded that
the D.C. Circuit case was binding until the court en banc or the

110 Id.
111 Id.

Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553).
"4 Eldred,239 F.3d at 381.
113

115 Id.
116 id.

117 Id. at 382.

I8 Id
"9Eldred,239 F.3d at 382.
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123

Supreme Court overruled its holding. 120 However, Judge Sentelle
disagreed with the majority as to Schnapper's holding. 121 Judge
Sentelle argued that Schnapper's scope was limited to the analysis
of copyright law as it appeared to works commissioned by the
United States government. 22 Although the D.C. Circuit case said
that it is unnecessary for each individual work to demonstrate that
it promotes progress, Judge Sentelle said it was proper to "require
that the exercise of power under which those applications occur
meet the language of the clause which grants Congress the power
to enact the statute in the first place."' 123 Furthermore, Judge
Sentelle argued that the language in Schnapper, announcing that
the preamble is not a limit, was confined to the limited analysis of
the case's unique circumstances and,
thus, was merely dicta, rather
124
than a holding with binding force.
Responding to the majority's attack on the dissent's adoption of
an amicus' argument, Judge Sentelle argued that he was merely
addressing the issue raised by the parties in the case - whether the
Copyright Clause limited Congress' power to extend copyright
protection. 125 The dissent points to the circuit court rules which
require that amicus curiae must not repeat the parties' arguments,
but elaborate on issues already raised. 126 Judge Sentelle maintains
that the amicus did indeed do this and did not implicate new
issues. 127 Furthermore, the court is not limited to the legal theories
presented by the parties, but can
"identify and apply the proper
128
law.'
governing
of
construction
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that Congress surpassed its
power to grant copyright protection because it did not promote the
120 id.

121 Id.
122 id.
'2
Id. at
24

383.

1 Eldred, 239 F.3d at 383.
125
Id. at 383.
126
Td.

127 id.
28

1 Id. at 384. (quoting United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of

Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,446 (1993))(citation omitted).
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progress of the useful arts.' 29 Consequently, Judge Sentelle found
the fact that the0 CTEA conformed to global copyright standards
was irrelevant.13
IV. ANALYSIS

A. To PromoteProgress
In addressing the appellants' contention that the CTEA violated
the "limited Times" requirement of the Copyright Clause, the court
refused to read the preamble of the clause as a restriction on the
requirement. The majority mistakenly relied on Schnapper v.
Foley,' a D.C. Circuit case, in reaching the conclusion that the
clause's preamble does not limit Congress' power to grant
copyright protection. A closer look at Supreme Court precedence
requires a contrary conclusion.
Specifically, the Supreme Court sanctioned reading the
introductory language as a restriction on Congress' power in
Goldstein v. California.13 2 The Court acknowledged that the
Copyright clause "describes both the objective which Congress
may seek and the means to achieve it. The objective is to promote
the progress of science and arts.'' 13 3 This is reiterated in Sony

Corp. v. Universal City Studios,134 where the Court stated that
Congress' power to grant copyright protection is:
Neither limited nor primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
'29Eldred, 239 F.3d at 384.
130Id.

13'667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
132 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
133
Id.
134 464

U.S. 417 (1984).
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125

special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after 135
the limited period of
expired.
has
control
exclusive
These Supreme Court cases refute the majority's view that the
Copyright 'Clause's preamble is not limiting and support the
dissent's view that the inherent language of the Copyright Clause
places limits on Congress' copyright power. Therefore, Congress
can only exercise this enumerated power "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."'136 Clearly, the Constitution's drafters
intended the preamble to limit the rest of the clause, as the
Copyright Clause is "one of only a few portions of the Constitution
to recite a purpose."' 137 The clause provides Congress the objective
to be achieved - to promote progress - and the means by which to
fulfill its objective - by granting copyright protection for a limited
time. Therefore, the Copyright
Clause not only grants Congress
138
it.
limits
also
but
power,
Assuming that the preamble restricts the "limited Times"
requirement, the majority argued that Congress adequately showed
that the CTEA was an appropriate means of achieving the end, to
promote the progress of the useful arts. 139 However, the court
gave too much deference to Congress without properly considering
whether the legislation did in fact promote progress and ignored
Congress' real reasons for passing the legislation. First, the
legislation does not promote progress, but restricts it, thus limiting
the richness of the public domain. The extension for neither
subsisting copyrights nor future copyrights stimulates artistic
135

Id. at 429.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
137 Joseph A. Lavigne, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the
136 U.S.

Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. L. REv. 311, 319 (1996).
See also Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The IntellectualPropertyClause as an Absolute Constrainton
Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. RnV. 1119, 1153 (2000).
138Paul J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The IntellectualPropertyClause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress,2000
U. ILL. L. REv.1119, 1160 (2000).
139 See supranotes 91-92.
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production. Second, Congress passed the legislation for economic
reasons and not to promote progress, thus abusing its enumerated
power.
B. The Failureto PromoteProgress
The court was satisfied that the legislation would promote
progress of the useful arts because Congress found that the
extension would give creators the incentive to preserve older
works. 140 However, this argument fails for several reasons. First,
the extension does not promote progress, but in fact inhibits it. As
the Supreme Court expressed in Sony Corp., copyright law "is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of special reward."' 14 However, by preventing
older works from entering the public domain, from which authors
may take and build upon legally, this creation cannot occur. Since
it does not benefit would-be creators building upon or inspired
from these older works, then whom does this extension benefit?
Surely it does not give incentive to the authors themselves, who
initially created these older works. Many of these authors are in
fact no longer alive, and therefore, can no longer create. Since the
original author is deceased and cannot enjoy copyright protection,
then who does? The interest in the copyright passes on to the
author's heirs or to whoever owns the copyright, presumably a
corporation - or more accurately, to those who had absolutely
nothing to do with the work's creation. 142 Since neither the heirs
140 Eldred

v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
142 Examples of copyright owners of works about to expire under the Copyright
141

Act of 1976, who will benefit under the CTEA include: Association for
Childhood Education and Time Warner for the song "Happy Birthday;" Turner
Entertainment (Time Warner) for the films "Gone With the Wind" and "The
Wizard of Oz;" Universal Pictures for the films "Frankenstein" and "Dracula;"
Time Warner for the cartoon characters Bugs Bunny and Porky Pig; and Walt
Disney for Mickey Mouse. Brigid McMenamin, Mickey's Mine!, FORBES
MAGAZINE, August 23, 1999, at 45, availableat

http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/com
mentary/Mcmenamin8-23-99 (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
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nor the corporation are the ones who created the work, how then
would granting them the monopoly of copyright protection give
them incentive to create? It does not. It merely grants them the
benefit of copyright protection - controlling the rights to the work
and reaping financial rewards - without exerting any intellectual
labor, the very thing that propagates the proliferation of the useful
arts. In fact, no amount of additional time will give incentives to
these copyright owners to generate more creative work, since they
are not the creators. Rather the extension merely grants them more
time to enjoy the financial rewards and to control the
dissemination of this work.
Congress attempted to argue that by granting this extension,
current copyright owners will be given incentive to restore these
older works. 143 However, the Constitution merely requires that
Congress must promote the progress of the arts. It does not
specifically limit the promotion to those current copyright owners,
but is intended to provide motivation to authors generally. Others
who are interested in the preservation of old works, such as the
appellants, may also restore these older works once they are in the
public domain. The majority argues that these older works will
disappear from the public domain if Congress cannot extend the
copyright terms. 144 However, the appellants have demonstrated by
the nature of their vocations and businesses - among them film
preservationists and a publisher of rare or out-of-print public
domain books - that individuals
and businesses that wish to
145
preserve these older works exist.
Furthermore, promoting progress does not mean restoring what
already exists. To promote means, "to contribute to growth,
enlargement or prosperity of; to forward; to further; to encourage;
to advance."' 146 Judicially defined in Goldstein, the Court stated
that "the terms 'to promote' are synonymous with the words 'to
143

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 379.

144Id.
145

As indicated supra, film preservationists, archives, and publishers that reprint
old and rare books are among the appellants. See supra notes 45, 48, 49 and
accompanying text.
146 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 844 (6th ed. 1991).
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147
stimulate,' 'to encourage,' or 'to induce.""
With respect to extended copyright protection for future works,
the additional twenty-year extension does not give incentive to
authors to work harder or produce more creative works.
Proponents of the extension maintain that this additional time will
give authors a longer window to exploit their work, and, therefore,
yield a greater economic reward for their efforts, which will
increase creation in the first place.148
This argument is
preposterous. As with subsisting copyrights, the author from
whom the creative works originated will be long dead before this
additional twenty-year benefit vests. She will not personally enjoy
this greater economic reward. Instead, her heirs or a corporation
holding the copyright will enjoy these fruits from her intellectual
labor. In other words, those who have not invested any time or
effort to create art will be able to ride on the coattails of the dead
author's genius and enjoy the copyright monopoly for an even
longer period. It seems unfair to grant these freeloaders such

powerful and ingratiating rights, in something she - or it - had

absolutely nothing to do with.
Moreover, extending copyright protection for future works will
not give incentive to authors to create more because the economic
reward is insignificant. 149 Hal R. Varian, Dean of the School of
Information Management Systems at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley, calculated the extension's effect on the copyright's
future cash flow in present value terms. 150 More specifically, he
determined the future value of $1 would be worth (l+r)n in n years
and $1 in the future would have a present value of 1/(l+r)n. 15 1 The
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
Joseph A. Lavigne, ForLimited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the
Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. L. REv. 311, 323 (1996).
49
1 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First
147
148

Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70 (2001); see also Paul J. Heald and
Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legistlative Power: The Intellectual
PropertyClause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1174 (2000).
"50 Hal R. Varian Affidavit 1, availableat
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
' Id. at 5.
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variable n represents the number of years and r represents the rate
of interest.152 Using these equations, he calculated the value of $1
received each year, dividing them into three periods, 1-50, 51-75,
and 76-95 years, and then added the present values.1 53 He
assumed four different interest rates - 5%, 7%, 10%, and 12%.'15
His results revealed that at a 10% interest rate, the present value of
the future cash flows are as follows: $9.92 from 1-50 years, $.08
from 51-75 years, and $.01 from 76-95 years. 5 5 Varian's
calculations illustrate the trivial effect the copyright extension has
on the economic reward given to the copyright holder. Instead,
"[t]he present value of the cash flows from 76-95 years is about 1
cent today - or one tenth of a percent of the value of the cash flow
in the first 50 years. '156 Hence, the additional twenty years of
protection provide a mere negligible return. Therefore, it does not
provide incentive for authors today to invest more time, effort, or
money into generating more works today. In fact, the calculations
suggest that the copyright has more value in its first fifty years
than its latter years. Moreover, authors will not take into
consideration this insignificant future benefit when deciding
whether to create something in the first place. Nor will companies,
deciding whether to create something new now, take this
negligible benefit into consideration. 157 Instead, companies
engaged in artistic production often do so to receive immediate
economic gain. 158 The negligible future benefit received during
the additional twenty years will not effect the decision now to
invest. Consequently, the CTEA provides no additional incentive
for authors to compose more creative works. Evidently, the
extension does not promote progress for either subsisting or
prospective copyrights.
152 1d.

15 3 Id.
IS4 id.

at 8.

'-5 Hal R. Varian Affidavit 8, available at
http:I/cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/varian.pdf
(last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
15
6Id. at 9.
157 Lavigne, supranote 2, at 968.
158

Id.
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Not only does the CTEA fail to promote progress, it also stifles
creation. It effectively prevents works from entering the public
domain for another twenty years. This moratorium prevents
authors from building upon these works during this time. It is
from this public domain authors may take material freely and add
159
their own innovation and experience to fabricate new works.
Their memories, experiences, inspirations, and influences can all
profoundly affect an older work and transform it into new
expression and art. 160 However, because of the CTEA, authors
who wish to use their experiences and unique perspectives must
first seek the permission of the copyright owners to use the work.
Therefore, further creation is at the behest of the copyright owners.
Would-be creators wishing to build upon these older works must
gain permission from current copyright owners, pay a royalty for
use of the work, no matter how much, and must abide by the
limitations the copyright owner places on the author's use of the
work. The creator may even be entirely denied permission.
The Gershwin Family Trust is an excellent example of the
immense power a copyright owner has over a creative work. The
Gershwin Family Trust, who owns the copyright to the play,
"Porgy and Bess," created in 1935, only allows an all-black cast to
perform the play. 16 1 Marc G. Gershwin, a co-trustee of the family
trust stated:
The monetary part is important, but if works of art
are in the public domain, you can take them and do
whatever you want with them. For instance, we've
always licensed 'Porgy and Bess' for the stage
performance only with a black cast and chorus.
That could be debased. Or someone could turn [it]

supra note 149, at 2.
1d. at 1007-08.
161 Gail Russell Chaddock, When is Art Free?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
159Litman,

16 0

MONITOR, June 11, 1998, availableat

http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/06/1 l/p5lsl.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2001).
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into rap music.

162

Gershwin's statement illustrates the control copyright owners have
not only over the work, but also the creation of new work. The
CTEA grants this copyright owner further economic reward - not
earned from investing its own intellectual labor but that of
someone else - and blesses it with the power to strangle creation.
Admittedly, the works will still go into the public domain.
However, the difference between the work entering the public
domain in twenty-five years as opposed to five years is significant.
The monopoly duration of the life of the author plus an additional
fifty years after the author's death already restricts the work
significantly. This lengthy period of protection has already
deprived authors from influencing and reshaping the work to
reflect the events and culture of the present time. Assuming the
original author of a work is twenty-five years old when she writes
a novel and she does not die until she is seventy-five, the work has
already been restricted for fifty years. Under the 1976 Act, the
work is restricted for another fifty years, equaling a 100-year
monopoly over the work. During those 100 years, many historical
events would have taken place affecting not only the society at
large, but also the creations from that society. The CTEA only
adds more time the work is restricted.
To illustrate, let us imagine that an author creates a musical in
1900, dies in 1950, and the musical's copyright protection under
the CTEA does not expire until 2020. During this span of time,
the United States has experienced unprecedented events such as
Women's Suffrage, The Civil Rights Movement, WWI, WWII, the
Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the AIDS epidemic. Looking at
these major historical events alone, one can see the development of
the United States as a nation and the different political and social
issues affecting it. Musically, the nation experienced the era of big
band, felt the impact of the British invasion, the rock innovation of
162 Dinitia

Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse

Joins the Fray,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at A13, availableat
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/nyt32898.hnl.
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Elvis Presley, and Seattle's grunge, witnessed the birth and
evolution of rap, hip-hop, and even bubble gum pop. Clearly,
these historical and cultural influences could deeply impact art
produced at that time. However, the copyright restricts the
musical work during these 120 years of exclusive rights and grants
the copyright owner with the power to filter how the historical and
musical events affect the work. The twenty-year extension of the
CTEA negatively impacts creation by excluding even more events
and generations of creators from influencing the work to reflect the
culture of the time. Not only would this deprive another
generation of authors from creating new art, the public would be
deprived of art influenced by different generations of people
exposed to different events and encountering different cultural
experiences. Admittedly, these historical and cultural events can
still influence works once the copyright expires, however, their
impact would be most significant at the time these events are
actually occurring. Authors can actively impact works in the
public domain with contemporaneous events, instead of trying to
remember the events, attempting to recapture all the emotions and
impressions incited when they first occurred, and trying to recreate
the gravity of their impact on them, as well as art, at a much later
time. Additionally, that author may not have been alive during the
occurrence of the past event to give an accurate perspective of that
time.
Current cultural experiences can have an enormous impact on
the creative arts. For example, the recent production of the
"Bomb-itty of Errors," a modem day hip-hop, rap version of
William Shakespeare's "Comedy of Errors," transformed
Shakespeare's trademark iambic pentameter cadence into modem
urban rhythm in the form of rap to tell the story. 163 In addition, the
play's creators adapted the characters into modem, urban
individuals.164 This version is clearly impacted by the different era
of music and urban influences of the late twentieth century. If
163

Richard Christiansen, 'Bomb-itty ofErrors'Delivers Refreshing Jolt,

CHICAGO TRIBUNE,

availableat http://www.bomb-itty.com/press-trib.htn (last

visited Dec. 14, 2001).
164 Id.
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Shakespeare's work was not available in the public domain, the
"Bomb-itty of Errors" creators - four New York University
students who created it as a class project 165 - would have had to
first seek the permission of the current copyright owners, who may
or may not allowed them to use the work, depriving the public of
their artistic innovation. Furthermore, without the availability of
old works in the public domain, Disney could not have created
such noteworthy, and arguably influential, films and productions
of our time such as "Pocahontas," "Snow White and the Seven
Dwarfs," "The Hunchback from166Notre Dame," "Apocalypse
Now," or "Jesus Christ Superstar."'
Another more recent example of historical, social, and cultural
influences impacting past works is Alice Randall's novel, "The
Wind Done Gone." Randall's book tells the story of Margaret
Mitchell's best-selling novel, "Gone With the Wind," through the
eyes of a slave. 167 Randall's novel attempts to correct the preCivil War depiction of blacks in Mitchell's novel, published in
Randall's work reflects the change of African1936.168
Americans' place in society today and the United States'
consciousness of racial discrimination and equality, shattering the
racist stereotypes depicted by Mitchell's pre-Civil War and preCivil Rights Movement perspective. 169 From looking at these
examples, it is evident how present day social, historical, and
cultural events and values impact older works, transforming them
into new and different works.
C. Congress'EconomicMotivation
By upholding the CTEA in Eldred, the D.C. Circuit ignored the
real reason for Congress' legislation. When this legislation was
165 id.
166

67

1

See supranote 42.
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1364 (N.D. Ga.

2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
168 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (1 1th Cir.
2001).
169
Netanel, supra note 149, at 2.
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considered in Congress, the Senate reported that the bill's purpose
was "to ensure adequate protection for American works in foreign
nations and the continued economic benefits of healthy surplus
balance of trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works."' 170 The
Senate explained that the extension would give the United States
"significant trade benefits by substantially harmonizing U.S.
copyright law to that of the European Union while ensuring fair
compensation for American creators who deserve the benefit fully
from their exploitation of their works." 171 The Senate continues to
argue its economic justifications for promoting the CTEA
throughout its report. 172 It is evident that Congress was not
seeking to promote progress of the useful arts, but simply to put
the United States economy and its authors in the most
advantageous economic position as possible.
Congress contended that the CTEA aligns United States'
copyright law with the European Union's ("EU") law; however; as
Judge Sentelle of the dissent point out, the EU must not follow the
United States constitution, but the U.S. must.1 73 Congress'
emphasis on the economic harm on the U.S. indicates that its
primary concern was not the advancement of the arts. Since the
Constitution mandates that Congress grant copyright protection for
a limited time only to promote the progress of the useful arts,
Congress went beyond its enumerated powers.
Moreover, Congress' concern of protecting the economy will
backfire. Congress argued that intellectual property is the United
States' second largest export. 174 It reasoned that without the
alignment of U.S. copyright law with the European Union's law,
the U.S. would be deprived of millions of dollars in export

170
71

1

S. REP.

No. 104-315, at 3 (1996).

id.

Id. at 6. For example, the Senate reviewed technological developments,
demographic and international changes, concluding that the current copyright
protection was "no longer sufficient to protect adequately our Nation's
economic interests in copyrighted works, and more importantly, the interests of
American authors and their families." Id.
173 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
72

'74S.

REP. No. 104-315, at 9-10 (1996).
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revenues.1 75 By extending the term, according to Congress, the
U.S. will benefit from exploiting these works longer instead of
letting the European Union take advantage of the U.S.' limited
monopoly term. 17 6 However, because the legislation gives
copyright owners twenty more years to financially benefit, these
works will not enter the public domain for another twenty years.
In effect, the public domain remains stagnant and the promulgation
of new works is stifled for these twenty years. Consequently, there
will be fewer works in the future for the United States to exploit
abroad from which it may reap financial benefits. The United
States will not only have less creative works to exploit under the
1976 Act term of life of the author plus fifty years, but also under
the twenty year extension. It seems then that it would be more
damaging to the economy. Moreover, as Professor Dennis Kariala
points out, the United States is the biggest market for older works,
not the European Union.'7 7 He explains that the United States'
trade surplus with the European Union are from newer works and
that
not from older works from the 1920s and 1930s - copyrights
78
passage.
CTEA's
the
for
not
were
it
if
would have expired
In short, the D.C. Circuit incorrectly analyzed the
constitutionality of the CTEA by blindly accepting Congress'
excuse for passing the legislation. Not only did Congress
improperly pass the CTEA for economic reasons, rather than to
promote the progress of the useful Arts as the Copyright Clause
requires, but the CTEA also will stifle the progress of the creative
arts. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit erred in affiming the district
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims.
D. Limited Times
The majority weakly argued that the extension met the "limited
Times" requirement because Congress did in fact grant copyright

75 H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 3 (1998).

176 id.

177 See supra note 42.
178 id.
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protection for a fixed term of years. 17 9 Furthermore, the court
relied on Congress' position that it was merely adhering to
international copyright standards, therefore, could not possibly be
trying to make copyright protection perpetual. 180 This limited
monopoly is illusory.
As long as Congress grants a term of years, according to the
majority, any amount of time achieves the limited time
requirement. 181 Construing the clause in this manner gives
Congress excessive power to grant as much time as it desires,
effectively creating a perpetual copyright. Defining the limited
time requirement in this manner is too elastic. Congress could
merely extend copyright protection to subsisting copyrights every
time protection is set to expire under the guise of enumerated
powers and a term of years. In fact, Congress has done this many
times, particularly from 1962 to 1976, when it extended protection
for subsisting copyrights seven times. 182 According to Professor
Nimmer, "continuous extension of protection at some point must
cross over the line, to becoming defacto perpetual in violation of
the Constitutional command."' 183 It seems that Congress' actions its repetitive extensions - have crossed this line. In effect,
Congress has given permanence to copyright protection by
extending its duration many times and has stripped the Copyright
18 4
Clause of any meaningful limits on congressional power.
What then does meet the limited time requirement? One
argument is that once a copyright has been granted, the duration of
that grant is the maximum, limited time.185 Therefore, any attempt
to extend the length fixed by this grant would violate the limited
179

Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

180 Id.

Id.
See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
183 Nimmer on Copyright §1.05[A][1] (2001).
' Copyright Craziness, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A22,
availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdynpagename=article&node=opinion&contentld=A22911-2001Au (last visited
Oct. 22, 2001).
185
Robert Patrick Merges and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The ProperScope of the
Copyrightand PatentPower, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 60 (2000).
181
182
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137

times requirement. 186
This "once granted" approach is
problematic. The very purpose of granting copyright protection is
to promote the progress of the useful arts. If the current copyright
protection is deemed no longer effective and the creative arts are
no longer progressing, this approach would strike down any
attempt by Congress to lengthen the protection. If this strict
approach had been invoked at the inception of the First Copyright
Clause, copyright protection would be cemented at fourteen years
of protection with a fourteen-year renewal term. Congress would
have no means of correcting its miscalculation of a workable
copyright term.
Another argument suggests that Congress is not required to find
the optimal length of time to stimulate creation. 18 7 Instead,
Congress needs merely to stimulate some creativity when it grants
a term of copyright protection. 188 Although this argument makes
perfect sense, it provides little guidance. How then are the courts
to determine whether Congress has violated the limited times
requirement? The only plausible way to determine whether an
extension meets the limited time requirement is to determine
whether the objective of the Copyright Clause has been met. If the
additional grant of time does not promote the progress of the
creative arts, then Congress has not used the means, which the
Constitution has provided to achieve this goal properly. It has not
granted protection for a limited time. Although Congress has
broad discretion to determine what the appropriate limited time is,
it is the courts' role to ensure that Congress is abiding by this
requirement. The only way to do this is to determine whether the
additional grant promotes progress. How then does one measure
what length stimulates growth? Economic analysis of the
additional benefit bestowed upon the copyright holder is an
appropriate starting point. As Professor Varian demonstrated
through his calculations of future cash flows at present value,
calculating the economic benefit given to the copyright holder is
indicative of creation incentives. Also, the courts should look at
186

d.
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7 Heald

and Sherry, supra note 138, at 1172.
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who is receiving these benefits. Is it the author, who is the target
of stimulation, or it merely the author's heirs or a corporation
benefiting from the work of another? And does this benefit
provide greater incentive to the author to create more works or
work harder? At this point - life of the author plus seventy years
protection - the likely answer is no.
V. IMPACT

As Professor Dennis Karjala of Arizona State University warns,
"[F]or the first time in our history, almost nothing is entering the
public domain." 189 As discussed earlier, this is stifling to artistic
innovation and advancement. If the public domain continues to be
restricted in this manner, the freedom to create new interpretations
of existing works is endangered. According to Harvard Law
School Professor Lawrence Lessig, a vibrant public domain could
result in a cultural windfall. 90 In other words, the more material
freely accessible in the public domain, the more works - or
building blocks - creators will have to work with and build onto,
which could result in an abundance of new art to the public's
benefit. It then follows that without a plentiful public domain,
American culture is deprived. Current creators would be limited to
what is already in the public domain - works already exhausted by
other creators. They would have to seek out the permission of the
copyright owner for use of the work. Furthermore, the would-be
creator would have to pay the copyright owner's requested royalty
- whatever the price - and be subject to the owner's conditions of
use. This effectively places boundaries on the author's creativity
and innovation. The effect an all-powerful copyright owner can
have on creators is evident in the Gershwin Family Trust's control
over "Porgy and Bess," as discussed earlier. Furthermore, a
twenty-year moratorium of works entering the public domain
prevents a whole generation of authors from contemporaneously
using their unique cultural experiences and perspectives to
18 9 See supra note 42.
190
Id.
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influence the adaptations, interpretations, or transformations of old
works.
Of course it would be difficult to pinpoint precisely of what
America's culture is being deprived, as these works are not yet
created. However, we can possibly foresee the impact of Eldred v.
Reno19 1 and the restriction of the public domain by viewing, in
retrospect, what has been contributed to the arts from the public
domain. Our modem day symbol of Santa Claus, Uncle Sam, the
Democratic donkey, -and the Republican elephant were all created
by the 19th-century cartoonist, Thomas Nast. 192 Had these
symbols' copyright owner been granted the protection under the
CTEA, they might not have become the cultural icons or national
symbols in the United States that they are today. Instead, the
government would have been forced to acquire the permission
from the copyright owner before publishing its version in political
posters or wartime propaganda posters and pay the requested
royalty fees. 193 If William Shakespeare's play "Romeo and Juliet"
were granted CTEA-like protection, its present-day copyright
owners might not have licensed its use for the creation of the New
York gang war musical, "West Side Story." 194 And even Disney one of the most adamant lobbyists for the CTEA - pillaged through
public domain characters and works, to create some of its most
successful products.1 95 Among these successes are "Pocahontas,"
"Snow White" and the "Seven Dwarfs," The Hunchback of Notre
Dame, the film "Apocalypse Now" (from the novel, "Heart of
Darkness"), and the musical "Jesus Christ Superstar" (from the
Bible).196 The negative effects the CTEA would have on the
public domain and the progress of creative arts is substantial and
evident. As previously discussed in depth, the additional twenty191 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
192 See supranote 42.
193id.
194 John Solomon,

Rhapsody in Green, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, January
3, 1999, availableat
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/com
entary/Solomonl-3-99.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
19s
See supranote 42, 196.
196Id.
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year moratorium the CTEA creates prevents historical events,
current culture, and authors from a particular generation from
building off those works that would otherwise be in the public
domain. Their insight, experiences, and perspectives would have
to wait the additional twenty years to the already lengthy
protection period, to influence older works. Even though the
works would eventually end up in the public domain, the delay
could affect the way past events impact the older works. Creators
would have to recapture and recreate the emotions and impressions
incited by the past historical, social, and cultural events. The
twenty-year delay could alter the author's perception of the events
or influences. She may forget the events' gravity, perceive the
events differently due to time's passage, or may no longer be
influenced by the events at all.
If the court had struck down the CTEA instead, rich copyright
owners - often time lucrative corporations such as Disney - would
not be able to rely on its old works to realize an economic
windfall. Instead, these copyright owners would be forced to
create new and vibrant characters and works to maintain their
substantial economic benefit and in effect, contribute to the
intellectual and artistic marketplace. It is vital to remember that
copyright law exists not to compensate authors, but to benefit the
public.197 Any financial benefit realized by an author is merely a
secondary concern and an avenue by which copyright's primary
goal may be achieved.
What is that primary goal? The
Constitution and a myriad of Supreme Court cases tell us that it is
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
VI. CONCLUSION

The Constitution's drafters created the Copyright Clause with
one interest in mind and one interest only - to ensure the creative
arts' vitality. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 empowered Congress
to give creators a limited monopoly over their creations. However,
it also limited the way and for what purpose Congress could grant
197
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this benefit. Because creation does not occur by creating
something out of nothing, but by building off or transforming the
works of others, copyright law's primary concern is to propagate
the creative arts for the public's benefit, and not to provide an
unrestricted and indefinite monopoly to authors or their heirs.
Therefore, a work's copyright protection persists for a limited time
and then it passes into the realm of the public domain. From this
public domain, authors may freely access these older works and
build off them. They may use their memories, historical events,
cultural influences, and personal experiences to transform the old
work into new expression. Old works are reincarnated into new
life and enable readers, observers, and listeners to experience them
with a whole new perspective or spin. It is this public domain that
enables creativity to continue and the creative arts to prosper. The
Constitution grants Congress the power and charged it with the
duty to promote this progress. Congress must use its copyright
power to do just this and nothing more. And it is the courts' role
to make sure Congress abides by this Constitutional mandate.
ChristineQuintos
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